The Global Context of Knowledge

The Global Context of Knowledge

Ali Asghar Kazemi
January 2008

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The age of internet and mass communication has created an environment in which we are compelled to think beyond conventional geographic and political boundaries. Proponents of globalism believe that we have no other choice than to conform to the requisites of a democratic culture and make use of a world language in order to express ourselves and exchange views with others. Opponents of globalization are quite skeptical about this development and warn against dangerous impacts of this trend on native cultures and languages around the globe.

Today I would like to devote my commentary in a very concise manner on this issue which I think needs serious attention at this critical juncture.

Using foreign languages as a tool of communication and expression of ideas is as old as the history of mankind. In the past centuries our scientists and scholars used Arabic to expose their thoughts and scientific findings to peoples of other nations. The same was true with European thinkers who wrote their treatises in Latin. Persian scientists, philosophers and thinkers found it easier to write their scholarly papers and works in Arabic language which was an important means of communication.

This has made a misunderstanding in the West and even in the Arab world to identify renowned Persian scientists and scholars such as Avicenna, Razi and Farabi, to name but a few, as Arab citizens. Indeed, these reputed figures knew well Farsi and they even composed wonderful poems in Persian, but preferred to write their scientific treatises in a language to be understood by people of other nations.

French language has had the same potentials in the colonial days but lost some of its strength after the rise of English as a worldwide workable and practical language. Yet, French are now conscious of the fact and are working hard to regain the early vigor and position of their language.

More recently with the proliferation of English in the 20th century, even French and German thinkers and philosophers had to publish their works in this language in order to be known outside their countries. For instance, Raymond Aron was unknown in American intellectual and academic center until the time his famous book Peace and War, A Theory of International Relations was translated into English. Commenting on this book, Henry Kissinger said “from now on nobody can claim to understand International Relations without reading Aron’s book.” German philosophers of the “Critical School” did the same after the Second World War.

Today, with the astounding propagation of mass communication in all domains, English and to some extent French languages are being used in the same context. Forcibly, this process has overshadowed many native languages and has created a source of inquietude for many cultures.

With the emergence of computer and internet facilities in the course of human civilization, the world has experienced a real revolution in the expression of thoughts and ideas. This has changed both the text and context of knowledge, discourse and means of interaction. This has induced even ordinary people to use this magic tool to share their views and ideas with others. It has also encouraged public to express their demands and protests against the ruling system without the hindrance of third parties; such as official media, papers, publishers, etc.

According to international media, Iranians rank third (after Americans and Chinese) in using the internet as a mean to communicate with the world. However, not all of them use the correct language (Farsi or English) for this purpose. In fact, most of them are using a strange mixture of Persian and English (ironically called Penglish) to exchange views and communicate.

Some well-wishers have warned against such development and have criticized the matter as an unwarranted snobbish way to undermine the Persian culture and language. While I agree partially with this concern, as somebody who has been involved in this process for some time, I have always encouraged my friends and students to use the proper English in order to express them-selves in their interaction with others.

Whilst I hate to speak of my proper case in these commentaries, I must remind that personally I have been writing in English and French in my academic sites and blogs during past several years. I found it much easier and more practical to do so, given the facilities provided by handy software, including dictionaries, automatic spelling and grammatical corrections along with other offline and online services.

With respect to my native tongue (Farsi), let me stress here that Persian is a sweet and lovely language which I have always admired and adored. Its intonation is poetic and musical and its scripture is splendidly artful. Those who know me could admit that I have a hand in Persian music, poetry and calligraphy and I enjoy immensely from these entire as wonderful hobby. I handle Persian with ease and grace. My numerous books and articles published in Persian bear good witness to this claim. Therefore, quite naturally I would be the first to defend my marvelous mother tongue in these respects. But, when it comes to the matter of communication with outside world, the problem arises differently in a wider dimension.

Whether we like it or not, this whole development has increased the speed, magnitude and momentum, as well as form and substance of people’s interaction and discourse beyond imagination. In fact, when we write in popular languages such as English or French, we are compelled to follow certain norms and abide by rules governing democratic culture. Because, in publishing an article or a commentary, we should always bear in mind that we will be judged by an immense variety of interlocutors spread throughout the world. Indeed, this feeling can be both deterring and inspiring. If we are a responsible person, it should incite us to fly the bird of our thought and imagination beyond the narrow limits of self-serving political frontiers by thinking and writing in a global context.

Unfortunately, most of our writers, scientists and scholars are little known outside Iran because they are missing this fantastic opportunity. Though we are relatively much better than many countries in this respect, still we lag behind many nations in the region. For example, look at India where once the Persian was the official and literary language. Now, due to some historical circumstances which go beyond our subject here, they shifted to English as their primary academic and administrative language. Indian writers, philosophers and scholars express their thoughts and views for the world parallel to those of their peers in other continents. But, in contemporary Iran, despite many illustrious thinkers and writers, none of them are known to others in a global scale.

In today’s Iran the matter of foreign language is not yet settled. Besides Arabic which is the basic requirement of Persian language, English is thought schools but with not much weight. Despite the fact that foreign language is a serious requirement for our PhD students, unfortunately many of them have a great deal trouble with it. I am fully aware of this handicap especially in graduate studies in politics and international relations. I don’t want to blame any particular institution for this deficiency, but I think something has to be done in this regard.

For my part to alleviate this shortcoming, I have always warned my students against using corrupt translations of textbooks and materials in the unscrupulous publishing market. I always encourage these folks to read first hand sources in English as much as they can. I have also put up an academic site in English which provides students with sources and materials related to their scholarly programs. Perhaps I was one of the few first academics inside the country who endeavored to construct blogs and sites for this purpose. However, lack of adequate basic knowledge in English is still a serious impediment on their way.

We need a national resolve free from ideological, political and chauvinistic constraints to cure this educational malaise if we want to learn and contribute to the body of knowledge in a global context.

To sum up, we can conclude our commentary in the following phrases:

· Science and knowledge do not recognize political and geographic boundaries and we should arm ourselves with the necessary prerequisites if we want to acquire them first hand;
· If we are sincere in our claim of contributing to the existing body of human knowledge, we ought to change our outlook of the world in communicating with others openly and peacefully;
· Important world languages are windows opening our mind and spirit to the prevailing paradigms and episteme in the course of exchanging thoughts and ideas;
· We ought to take a bold step to exchange our thoughts with others in order to reach a common ground for mutual understanding in building a safer environment for us and our future generations./

Politics and Hypocrisy (2)

Politics and Hypocrisy (2)

Ali Asghar Kazemi
December2007
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In our previous commentary on this subject we argued that the marriage of religion and politics in pursuit of power gives birth to hypocrisy. Simple explanation for this phenomenon is that complex problems and functions of society can not be carried by supra-natural order as interpreted by ideology.

Common sense dictate that political leaders should be truthful to people whom they need their support for reelection. To that end, they have moral responsibility to rely on reason and logic in political process for the fulfillment of people objectives. This requires science, technical know-how, material and moral capital. Naturally, religion can not supplant these requisites since they are not accessible through mere pretension and ideological rhetoric. In this respect our political leaders are part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

On the other hand, with respect to religious role as the Indian philosopher Radhakrishnan once said: “It is the function of religion to turn the world upside down, to make revolutionary demands. If religious men take interests in secular problems, they are convicted of a gross betrayal of religion.” [1]

Political power has an implied connotation of coercive influence, whereas spiritual and religious power relates to persuasive influence. Religion exerts influence over human behavior. But a great deal of religious or spiritual power that we observe in political life is carried under the auspices of nominally religious persons, groups or institutions, may well be a kind of secular power which is hiding behind religious symbols or garb.[2]

On the assumption that power is not an end in itself, how then the two spheres, competing for influencing man in his material and spiritual world can come to an agreement? If man were driven by an insatiable greed for power, as Thomas Hobbes asserts in Leviathan,[3] and Machiavelli had suggested earlier in The Prince,[4] then the world would experience an endless war, and every one would live in permanent fear and frustration. But, presumably the ethical and religious dimension of the” political man” tend to restrain human being from behaving by mere material obsession and desires.

Prophets have come to world in order to show man the right path to truth and salvation. But, few of them however, have been successful. Machiavelli observed that all armed prophets have conquered and unarmed prophets have failed. Realistically, power can be thought of as “the instrument by which all other values are obtained.”[5] Since many people consider power as a value in itself, it is safe to say that power functions both as means and ends. Thus, men can share power over nature, but power over human mind is something for which men must compete.[6]

If we perceive the religious sector and the political sector as two actors engaged in competition in some sort of “zero-sum-game,”[7] whatever one side gains equals the losses of the other side. This is more or less the Machiavellian view of power that once said “the Prince who advances another prince’s power, diminish his own.” This is a non-cooperative game as opposed to cooperative game in which the two parties may in fact gain in their interaction, provided they start up with such intention. This makes the difference between an authoritarian dictatorship and democratic political system.

When a spiritual leader sets out to compete with the temporal sector in gaining political power, the case immediately represents as a zero-sum-game, leading to non-cooperative and antagonistic behavior. The problem therefore is whether it is possible to discover elements and situations in which the religious and political sphere can play a game that eliminates antagonism, conflict and hostility, and enhances cooperation, construction and compassion.

Secularist ideal claim that the only way to strike a balance and to reach a mutually constructive solution is to delimit the domain within which each sector can maneuver in order to direct human being toward the path of material welfare as well as spiritual salvation. The two sectors shall then cooperate in using their persuasive and coercive influence for common objectives of people. But in practice the matter is not so much clear and history of mankind has proven that it has never been possible to strike the desired balance.

The hundred year’s war of fifteenth century resulted continuous conflicts over the distribution of power between religious and temporal sectors, church and the state or popes and the kings. In the seventeenth century the same issues provoked the thirty years war. The resurgence of secularism replaced the medieval theocratic paradigm and ushered the age of enlightenment.

The secular consideration of power began its reappearance with Machiavelli’s doctrine of pragmatism in political theory. The basis of this doctrine was to answer the question of what needs to be done by a ruler to remain in power. That is to say that the necessity of political life often required the breaking of moral low. [8] Machiavelli’s princes, unlike Plato’s philosopher-kings, ruled because they were shrewd in manipulating power. Thus, power became devoid of virtue. For Machiavelli, good and evil were traits of all human being and a successful ruler had to be “part lion and part fox.” [9]

Bertrand Russell wrote that faith, ideology and religion as a whole are undisputed elements in forming the power of a state.[10] Indeed ideas influence the development and use of command over power and violence. In cases were nations are not fully developed from a political-democratic standpoint and party politics as well as other social institutions lack the necessary appeal to unite people in the pursuit of their objectives , religion can fill the gaps. Translated into ideology when put into motion, religion may assume a determinant role in a society, provided it is properly used.[11] It can also weaken a state, and deteriorate its internal and external relations if its potential power is not directed toward constructive path and is used in the pursuit of evil objectives.
We shall continue this discussion in our future commentaries.


Notes

[1] S. Radhakrishnan, Religion in a Changing World, London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1967, p.51
[2] Cf. J. Milton Yinger, Religion in the Struggle for Power, Durham, N. C. Duke University Press, 1946, p.15
[3] Thomas Hobbes work Leviathan appeared in 1651. The biblical title, which means a monster of the sea, was a suggestive symbol of England’s rising sea power.
[4] The Prince was written in1513. Its main characteristics are its complete abandonment of morality and consideration of politics entirely in terms of causes and effects.
[5] See Karl Deutsch, Politics and Government, How People decide their Fate? P.31.
7. Idem.
[7] A zero-sum-game is a game in which the payoffs of all players add up to zero. See e.g. Martin Shubik(Ed) Game Theory and related Approaches to Social Behavior, New York: John Wiley & Son, 1964; Steve J. Brams, Game Theory and Politics, New York: Free Press, 1975.
[8] . See e.g. David E. Apter, Introduction to Political Analysis. (Pretice Hall of India, New Delhi, 1981, p.77.
[9] .see: Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism. (New Haven: Yale University press. 1962), Quoted in David E Apter, Ibid.P.78.
[10].CF. Bertrand Russell, Power, A New Social Analysis, (New York: Norton, 1938), PP.145-156.
[11]. This is especially true in the case of the Third world states where political parties as key organizations for uniting people of different and rather immature opinion can not perform social and political results. A party, said, Edmond Burke, is a group of men united to promote, the common good in accordance with a principle upon which they are agreed. In the Third World the most widely accepted principles belong to religious teachings.

Cahier Poetique

Cahier Poetique

Religion, Peace and War: The Belligerent Islam

Religion, Peace and War
The Belligerent Islam*

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
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“Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you. And that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But God knows, and ye know not.”

(Qur’an 2:216)



Religious Intolerence and War

“ Rulers ought to employ a page to repeat to them every morning: see that you do not torment anyone on account of his religious opinions, and that you do not extend the power of the sword to touch the
conscience.[1]
Pierre Bayle (1647-1706)


It is suggested that the manifestation of religious precepts in society is sharply revealed against the background of war. At the outset, an attempt to find out major religions attitude toward war and peace, as important institutions of the society, may give an insight of the sociology of religions.

From the dawn of human civilization all prophets and all religions have been involved in some kind of war. It is suggested for example, that the Christian religion has more often been a factor for war than for peace.[2] Other religions have not followed a pacifist pattern of behavior through times either. In fact, during conflicts and wars in which religions have been somehow involved, atrocities and inhuman behavior have reached their peak.

It has been said that men differ from animals in their unique capacity to persecute and exterminate one another for the sake of general ideas and beliefs which they even are incapable to understand.[3] History bears witness that man’s fiercest wars have been fought over conflicting ideologies and religious beliefs. These controversies have paved the way to power for those leaders who were successful in manipulating both abstract ideas and their fellow-believers. When these leaders themselves firmly believe in their ideas, they become ruthless fanatics. Fanatical leaders who arrogate to themselves the exclusive right to interpret the ideology, or a fortiori the divine law, create a situation in which their credulous followers tend to show a belligerent and aggressive attitude towards whoever deviates from their way of thinking and perception.

Politics, whether viewed as a struggle for power, promotion of values, pursuit of interest or simply the manner of handling problems of the society, is a complex phenomenon which has made history of mankind through long centuries. History to politics and government is like nature to biology or physics. It is a source of a major part of our political experience.[4]

Centuries before the rise of Darwinism, men had been convinced of the reality of good and evil which led men to act in a moral universe of rational causality which is but a reflection of the Devine.[5] Yet, men enjoyed freedom of choice, and they were responsible for their decisions. The result of moral deficiency in man, whose motives were good or bad, was conflict, war and antagonism.

Whereas most religious teachers, philosophers and prophets have cautioned rulers against aggression and war and held forth visions of a day when swords would be beaten into ploughshares,[6] history has witnessed bloody religious wars or wars directed by religious leader and fought for political power.

Advocates of religion have sometimes become missionaries of hatred toward other religions.[7] Scholars and philosophers believe that such an attitude and behavior is something inconsistent with the spirit of true religion.[8] Long ago, in an age of acute religious antagonism, Hugo Grotius asserted that there was no sense at all in Catholics and Protestants seeking to impose their special dogma upon each other; and that, if only they would think quietly, instead of feeling wildly, humanity would be relieved of much meaningless wastage and much atrocious suffering.[9] The fanaticism of the religious as well as that of the anti-religious may not breed wars but they still use weapon of hate, misrepresentation, distortion and suppression.[10]


The Struggle for Power over ideas

“All the life and power of true religion consist in the inward and full persuasion of the mind and faith is not faith without believing…. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it can be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force….”
John Locke[11]


When religion is viewed from the point of view of human interaction and in relation to other forms and processes of man’s collective behavior in a society, the concept of power as a determining factor of influence comes immediately into picture. If we regard religion as the domain in which faith dominates reason and rationality, then we may find ourselves in a painful and disappointing world, and in fact the role of power in this realm would be critical.[12]

Reinhold Neibuhr has provided an image of religion which is “an effort to answer the challenge pessimism.”[13] Religion- as a process of life to adjust the realities and the relative to the ideals and the absolute[14]- seems to be the perception of the modern world. In a world dominated by power and subjected by politics, religion can be in fact a significant factor in shaping the future of our societies.

Even though one may repudiates the whole evolution and necessity of metaphysical system, from Plato’s idealism to Marx’s materialism, religion seems to be an inescapable part of our thinking and behavior in society.[15] Its main function is to exert power over ideas with the final objective of man’s salvation. Power itself is a complex phenomenon in human relations and politics. Many elements contribute to it or detract from it. The concept of power, poses one of the most difficult and controversial problems of social and political life. Both political scientists and international relation experts have written a great deal about it. [16]

Power is sometimes defined as coercive influence distinguished from persuasive influence.[17] The distinction, however, is not quite clear. Since, persuasion plays a role in mobilizing and exercising power, and possession of power enhances the ability to persuade. When we speak of power we may be referring to such concept as influence, authority, control, force, might, etc. thus the term power is sometimes confounded with material resources, wealth, social status, moral or spiritual influence. In simple terms power, is the ability of controlling minds or actions of human being. Political power refers to the “mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large.”[18] It is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.[19]

Some writers have tried to assimilate power to political scientist as the notion of scarcity to the economist.[20] Thus, they seek to discover the ingredients of power in their concentrated and abstracted form.[21]Power is indeed less neat and calculable than scarcity and the student of politics lacks generally accepted standards of measure (like gold or money). Therefore, the need for theorizing and hypothesizing about the formation and application of power by using other disciplines, ideology and belief system etc. becomes evident.

Power is a combination of persuasive influence and coercive force. An optimistic view of this paradigm is that those who wield power normally prefer to achieve their end merely by posing the threat of effective sanction, without actually resorting to physical force.[22] But, we will see later how in certain situations, especially revolutionary conditions, the opposite becomes a rule. Power may be exerted through coercion or persuasion, by the legitimate authority of a man or institution or a combination of them.[23] Political power shall be distinguished from force in the sense of the actual exercise of physical violence.

Power exercised with moral or legal authority is considered legitimate. Naturally, legitimate power has a stronger influence over the will of its object.[24] Political ideologies serve the purpose of endowing political power with the attributes and appearance of legitimacy.

Charisma is an important element in the acquisition and exercise of political power through charismatic authority. Those who seek power, sometimes use particular religion or ideology for the concealment of their true objectives.[25] The function of law, morality and ethics is to keep aspirations for power within accepted norms and tolerable bounds. Within a particular society, the normative order which puts restraint on individual aspiration for power is the result of political interaction among social forces for gaining influence.[26] Politics can be said to mean interaction, competition and finally struggle for power. This definition seems to be valid both in national as well as international politics.[27]

For many people power is also a value in itself.[28] But, essentially it shall not be considered as such, since it is an objective serving as a means for the achievement of other goals or desires. Thus, though politics is a struggle for power, it should not be regarded as this alone.[29] Power may in practice become an end in itself for some participants in the struggle, but not for all of them. The outcome of power struggle may be cooperation or conflict[30], depending on the kind of game which individuals or states as actors in political scene may play.

It has been suggested that if the statesman of the nineteenth century had commanded the present destructive forces (including the nuclear arsenal), unlike their ancestors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were under no compulsion to multiply the risks of international politics by engaging in ideological crusades.[31]
It may be partly true that the power structure and general characteristics of our age has subdued by necessity the hostile relations between and among major powers. But the emergence of certain radical religious trends in our present world seems to go beyond and above the prevailing power structure.

Today, the ideological conflicts of the cold war era has given way to some sort of clash, not necessarily between civilizations, as suggested by professor Samuel Huntington, but among religious fundamentalism and the Western societies in their entirety. However, we should not associate directly this fundamentalism with Islam or any particular branch of it, like Shiism. Of course, the unfortunate events of September 11 have put Islam in the forefront of all terrorist activities throughout the world. But one shall remember that other religions have their own particular brand of fundamentalists zealous who are ready to sacrifice their life for the causes of their beliefs and faith.

The emergence of religious-ideological movements, led by fundamentalist or fanatical men such as Ben Laden and his associates in the Alqaeda terrorist groups, who do not hesitate to annihilate the whole civilization for the sake of their beliefs or what they think to be truth is indeed a dangerous development at the beginning of the 21st century. In the past, these ideological battles were called religious wars; they are now ideological conflicts.

We indeed live in a time when fanatics divide human beings into two separate ideological camps. Those who are subject to violence and terror (this includes almost all Western powers, their allies and sympathizers) and those few who somehow are supportive of terrorists[32]. Unfortunately, this quite radical distinction has caused a lot of trouble to independent-minded analysts who wanted to find about the truth of either side’s arguments. Thus, social and political researchers in Moslem countries face the risk of being denounced as heretics or traitors in taking either side. Any deviation from this conflicting realm seems to cause trouble one way or another.

Ideas can conquer human minds without the initial support of organized power or use of force. Histories of several religious movements, in Islam, Christianity as well as other religions, have proven the argument. The European civilization owes much of its success of its “religious wars” of the past, now the ideological conflicts continue to be exploited one way or another. But, in the long run, the use of force, coercion or otherwise organized power, have necessitated their maintenance. When the source of legitimate power was claimed to originate from God, people were subjugated and treated like slaves, and tyranny resulted.

Once the battle Poitiers[33] decided the question whether Europe would remain Christian or become Moslem. The religious wars ended in a compromise which was founded on a frank recognition of power as the final arbiter between the Catholics and the Protestants.[34]

Although it is true that religions and ideologies know no physical frontiers and transcend geographical limits and are aimed at human minds, it has to be recognized that power and force play a decisive part in this struggle. The role of force and power is extremely important in the initial phase of this conflict until the outcome is decided. Thenceforth the use of force gradually loses its effectiveness until such time that subjugator no longer can sit on bayonets. Unless a credible system is established during this interval, sooner or later the appeal of ideology will diminish and the people will revolt against the tyranny of ideas.


Islam, Fanaticism and Conflict

Islam is a lucid illustration of a religion which in its inception makes no contradiction between ethical theory and political practice.[35] For centuries Moslem scholars maintained that the concept of holy war (Jihad) - not quite unlike to Christian bellum Justum had a permanent character in religions among Moslem and non-Moslem territories.[36] Assuming that Islam was, and still is considered a universal religion and system of belief, these two territories would (at least theoretically) be in a state of permanent hostility and war.

More modern liberal Moslem writers stress that the term refers not only to international war but also to the spiritual struggle for perfection within the heart of man.[37] There is no consensus among Moslem scholars about the concept of peace and war in Islam. But the subject is viewed as an integral part of the conception of the international order in Islam.[38]

According to one view, Islam’s basic attitude towards the international order is that it must be transformed into a moral order. Thus, this perception is inherently an anathema the secular international order built on the political premise of the territorial state.[39] Therefore, Islamic state shall not be viewed as the term customarily applies in modern law of nations; since only religious affiliation determines the extent and the realm of Islamic community which is generally referred to as Dar-al-Islam.[40] Outside this community-state everything else is considered as Dar-al- Harb, which include hostile and aggressor states against the Islamic community.

The argument which certain Western scholars have advanced with regard to the state of permanent belligerency of Islam stems from the interpretation of the principle of Jihad or the Holy War against Dar-al-Harb. This is the principle of perpetual enemy with and of coercive attitude and aggressive behavior against the unbelievers and infidels.[41] From a moral perspective the struggle is viewed as permanent confrontation between truth[42] and falsehood.[43] On the assumption that Islam is the universal religion and should ultimately bring the whole world under its reign, these scholars hold the view that war and belligerency are the fundamental and necessary institution of Islamic state.[44]

These views, however, are challenged and in some instance rejected by other scholars, especially liberal intellectual Moslems who profess secular mode of governance or separation between religion and state. These latter, who are mostly influenced by Western Modern secular state system, try to give a more democratic picture of Islam.

To this view, war is never waged against nations and peoples with the objective of securing their conversion to Islam, since the Holy Qur’an prohibits any form of compulsion in religion.[45] But, war in Islam is waged only against aggressors.[46] That is to say, Islam seeks to avoid war at all times and permits war only when it has exhausted all peaceful means of resolution of the situation which is provoking armed conflict.[47]Furthermore, it is suggested that once the enemy ceases his aggression and seeks peace, the war must cease through a settlement which necessarily involves restoring the status quo ante bellum.[48]

Islamic scholars and jurisprudents have given various interpretations to the notion of Jihad. For example, according to contemporary Shiite conception, Jihad, is “a life-giving source” which is now being expanded to encompass not only the defense of Islam and Moslems to foreign aggression, but also as a war initiated by Moslems in order to revive the Devine and natural religion of monotheism. Furthermore, the function of Jihad is “to liberate human being from the pressures imposed upon them by tyrants and evil forces rebellious against God, to restore to humanity its lost dignity and to destroy polytheism…”[49] Indeed, with this interpretation of Jihad, the implications for world order would go too far.

From the foregoing suggestions, it becomes clear that in effect, a true Islamic state must remain in permanent state of war and belligerency against “the pollution of polytheism” on the earth and its manifestations in all forms, until it is eradicated and the religion of monotheism is established.[50]

A leading Shiite scholar and famed exegete of the Qur’an, Allamah Sayyed Muhammad Husain Tabataba’i, has pointed out that “monotheism, and socio-political system based on it, are based on human nature and constitute the sole way for betterment of the condition of humanity.”[51] From a sociological point of view, the concept of Jihad here is related to the “natural right” of man to guarantee his survival, to defend the Truth against falsehood in a monotheistic society.[52] Proponents of this idea recognize no condition for Jihad “except the capacity of Muslims to resort to armed confrontation.”[53] This implies that whenever the Islamic State has gained enough power and felt capable of overpowering its enemies, Moslems have to take up arms “in order to achieve the goals of the Devine prophets, to level the way of true knowledge of God, and to remove all barriers from its way.”[54] Thus Jihad is a sacred duty of faithful Moslems for all times, and presumably, the permanent task of an Islamic state against infidels throughout the world.

By putting war, aggression and belligerency within the moral code, war in Islam is the defense of virtue and truth against evil and falsehood. This considers the authentic Moslem opinion on war which in practice has seldom been observed in the lifetime of Islam. Historical facts and events have proven that whenever Islam was used in support of political power as a source of legitimacy, the deviation from the principles of faith has been unavoidable.


Islam and Persian Nationalism

Ancient Persia, whose unity was centered around Mazdaean religion, after its conversion to Islam in seventh century A. D. identified itself with the Shiite[55] heresy which was at variance with the established Islamic orthodoxy practiced elsewhere in the Middle-East.[56] Thus, just at the time Europe was returning in the great upsurge of the Renaissance, a politico-religious conflict emerged between the two great powers of the time, i.e. Iran and Turkey. The Ottoman Empire, the instrument of Turkish imperialism presented the Sunnite orthodoxy and the Iranian Empire founded on the Persian national ideal incorporated in the Shiite heresy. The two opponents threw themselves at one another’s throats. The outcome was bloody long wars which ultimately established a new balance of power shared between two Moslem empires of diametrically opposed viewpoints.[57]

In the contemporary Islamic community, as in the past centuries, the worst enemies of Moslem states are paradoxically enough the Islamic countries themselves.[58] The war between Iran-Iraq is an example in which the idea of Jihad or holy war has been used and abused. It may seem an academic question, but it is appropriate to query, whether the concept could have any relevance in a war waged and conducted between two Moslem nations. It is indeed a dilemma for the Islamic community and a serious challenge to the interpretation of the principle of just war, fought for the protection of a political or ideological system.[59] Here is again the situation in which vices of politics overshadow the virtues of religion.

Although the concept of Jihad has gradually lost its strict warlike ad belligerent character, due to past failure of Moslem rulers to call and organize for holy war, in recent years, especially after the 1979 Revolution in Iran, the concept has regained some relevance in national and international scenes.[60]

The new Islamic crusade calls for a return to fundamentalism, a holy war against decadent, Western inspired modernization in Moslem countries. Convinced that Western influence erodes Islamic principles and fails to solve social problems, militant Moslems seek a strict interpretation of the Qur’an.[61] The fundamentalist movement has gradually turned into fanaticism, social unrest, political assassinations, upheaval and terrors throughout the tormented world. The trend is fearfully regarded as a serious threat to the international democratic social and political order.

Ideally, Islam, as the name itself indicates, is the religion of peace, brotherhood and compassion. War and violence would therefore be contradictory to its very spirit, unless it is waged in self-defense and for a just cause. Indiscriminate and wanton killing, devastating the natural environment, destroying harvests, defoliation, and deforestation are acts strictly forbidden and against the true spirit of Islam. Yet, in this world of paradox we experience all these ferocities being committed by Moslems against Moslems under the banner of Islam[62]. Hardly an impartial arbiter can judge the situation from the Islamic perspective. Since, Holy Scripture, traditions and Islamic jurisprudence can always be interpreted in supporting one’s evil policy and aggressive or hostile behavior. When politics and the pursuit of power become the prime concern of the state, religion and its moral restraints becomes an instrument of policy rather than its ethical guideline.

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Notes

* The main structure of this study is taken from my Religion and Politics: In Search of Compatibility and Compromise, Monograph, 1986.

[1]. Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, quoted by Arnold Toynbee, An Historian’s Approach to Religion, op. cit. p. 167.
[2]. CF. Norman Bentwich, The Religious Foundation of Internationalism, quoted in: S. Radhakrishnan, Religion in a Changing World (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1967), p. 49.
[3]. CF. W. W. Kulski, International Politics in a Revolutionary Age, Second Revised Edition (J.B. Lippincott Company. 1968), Chapter VII on Ideological Conflict, at pp. 389-390.
[4]. Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government: How People Decide their Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1974), p. IX.
[5]. See: Daniel Lerner, Cause and Effect (New York: Free Press, 1965), esp. pp. 1-5.
[6]. See e.g. Inis L. Claude. Jr., Swords into Plowshares the Problems and Progress of International Organization, (New York: Random House, 1967), Passim.
[7]. Radhakrishnan, Religion in a Changing World. Op. cit., p. 117.
[8]. Ibid. p. 118.
[9]. Quoted in idem.
[10]. Idem.

[11]. John Locke. A Letter Concerning Toleration, Quoted in Arnold Toynbee. An Historian’s Approach to Religion, op. cit. p. 256.

[12]. At the outset, it should be mentioned that no attempt is made here to provide specific and universally accepted definition for religion. For the purpose of this study religion is taken in its broadest and most general sense coming into interaction with social and political matters. Religion here is taken as it manifests in society whatever its essence. Though there may be need in some instances to settle the problem of definition, but this is done only in connection with man’s interaction with his political, social and economic environment. Various definitions given by writers and scholars are sometimes contradictory. Durkheim defines it as the expression of group solidarity and crowd mentality; Nietzsche has interpreted religion as “the slave in revolt” attempting to obtain some control over his master; theologians define religion as the revolution to man of the reality and majesty of God; Arnold called it “morality touched by emotion”. CF.J. Milton Yinger, Religion in the Struggle for Power (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.1946) pp. 4-5.
[13]. According to Neibuhr, religion “seeks a center of meaning in life which is able to include the totality of existence, and which is able to interpret the chaos as something which only provisionally threatens its cosmos and can ultimately be brought under its dominion.” See his Christianity and Power Politics, p. 179. Quoted in ibid. p. 228.
[14]. CF. Religion in the Struggle for Power, ibid. p. 5.
[15]. CF.S. Radhakrishnan, Religion in a Changing World. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1967), p.75.
[16]. See e.g.: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred. A.Knoff.1973) p. 27ff.
[17]. Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1966), p.199.
[18]. Hans J. Morgenthau, op.cit.p.28.
[19]. Idem.
[20]. David E. Apter, Introduction to Political Analysis (New Delhi. Pretice- Hall of India. Private Limited.1981 ) p.6.
[21].Idem.
[22]. George Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: a Study of World Society (New York: Frederick A. Praeger.1951, pp.13-14.
[23]. CF. Ibid. p.29.
[24]. Ibid.p.30.
[25]. CF.Ibid. p. 225.
[26]. CF. Hans J. Morgenthau, Ibid. p. 228.
[27]. Ibid. p.9.
[28]. Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government, op. cit.p.31.
[29]. Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics, op cit. p. 11.
[30]. Idem.
[31]. W. W. Kulski, International politics in a Revolutionary Age (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company. 1968), p. 389.
[32] This division has been initially made by U.S. president George W. Bush after September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks.
[33]. Poitiers is located in Southern part of France where in a decisive battle French Charles Martel crushed the Arab invasion in 732. A.D.
[34]. The expression cuius regio, eius religio was and admission that each prince could impose his religion on his subject, presumably by virtue of his being the holder of power. See: Kulski, op. cit. p. 391.
[35]. See: generally, Bernard Lewis, (ed.) Islam: Volume II: Religion and Society (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers. 1974)
[36]. This is the distinction between dar al-Islam (the territory under Islamic rule) and dar al-harb (the territory of war).
[37]. See for example: Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1955), and M. Khadduri. “The Islamic Theory of International Relations and its Contemporary Relevance,” in J. Harris Proctor, (ed.) Islam and International Relations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 24-39.
[38]. CF. e.g. Imran N. Hossein, “War and Peace in Islam,” in Defense Journal, A monthly Mirror and Digest of Geo-Strategic Affairs, vol X. No. 5-6. 1984 (Karachi-Pakistan), pp. 1-12.
[39]. CF. Ibid. p. 2.
[40]. Certain scholars include in the Dar- al- Islam not only the community of the Islamic states but also peace loving non-Moslem community states. CF. Ibid. p. 3.
[41].CF. Hans Kruse, The Foundation of Islamic International Jurisprudence. (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, n, d.), pp. 5-6.
[42]. Haq or al- Haq.
[43]. Batil or al-Batil.
[44]. CF. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 1955). Pp. 52-4.
[45]. “There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error….” Qur’an, 2: 256.
[46]. “And fight in the cause of God those who fight you.” Qur’an, 2: 190.
[47]. The prophet is sad to have advised the Moslem believers: “Do not be keen to meet the enemy on the battle field.” Quoted in Imran N. Hossein; War and Peace in Islam,” op. cit. p. 5.
[48]. “But if the enemy inclines toward peace, do thou also incline.”
[49]. See: Ahmad Jannati (Ayatollah), “Defense and Jihad in the Qur’an,” in Al-Tawhid, A Quarterly Journal of Islamic Thought and Culture, Vol. I, No. 3. Tehran, April 1984, pp. 39-54, at 47.
[50]. Ibid. pp. 47-48.
[51]. Cited in Ibid. P. 46. See also his “Islam and the modern Age,” in Al-Tawhid, Vol. I. No. 2. PP.60-80. Passim.
[52]. “O believers, fight the unbelievers who are near to you and let them find harshness in you…” (Qur’an: 9:123).
[53]. Ahmad Jannati, op. cit., p. 51.
[54]. Ibid. p. 50.
[55]. Shiism traces its heritage to Imam Ali, the son-in-law of the prophet Mohammad. It has been state religion in Iran since 1501. See also infra pp. 206-223.
[56]. Jacques Pirenne, The Tides of History vol. II (From the Expansion of Islam to the Treaties of Westphalia), (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1963), P. 398-9.
[57]. CF. Ibid. p. 399.
[58]. CF. Abdul Rahman Siddiqui, Brig. (Ret), “Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament- The Islamic Perspective”, in Defense Journal, Karachi, vol. X. No.3. 1984. pp. 1-7.
[59]. CF. Ibid.
[60]. For early manifestations of this new trend see: “A New War”, in Newsweek, November 20. 1978. p. 68.
[61]. One such organization pledging to restore the old faith in Malaysia (the Army of Allah) insisted that all non-Moslems be driven into the sea, Newsweek, Ibid.
[62] The Alqaeda terrorist activities under the banner of Islam in Iraq and elsewhere in Moslem and non-Moslem countries are unfortunate indications of this phenomenon.

* The Guardian State (3)

The Guardian State (3)
Legitimacy: Religious Approach

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
_____________________________________________________________


Introduction

A government is said to be “legitimate” if the people to whom it orders are directed to believe that the structure, procedures, acts, decisions, policies, officials, leaders and the whole political apparatus possess the quality of rightness, propriety, or moral goodness.[1] When a political system bases its ideology on religious standards, subjective elements are used to justify and strengthen legitimacy. Thus, scholastic rhetoric becomes a useful tool for the leader to narrow the gap between the reality of the society and the goals and objectives prescribed by the ideology. But, experience has shown that legitimacy can not get established with simple rhetoric, even though the instrument of power may be in the hands of the ruler. This means that it requires a number of other elements in order to transform the power into authority and hence to legitimacy.[2]

The guardian state, as said before, is the product of social crises, political radicalism and economic inefficiency. This system, with the attributes mentioned in previous sections of this research, has no other choice than to rely on religious, ideological or revolutionary fervor in order to continue to remain in power and hence tends to overcome and suppress any challenge or dissention.


The Function of Political Legitimacy

In order to pass judgment on the legitimacy of a particular political system, one must find out first, how it performs, second whether it is able to produce expected outcome and third, how it functions in producing the desired outcome.

A systematic approach to the analysis of a political unit helps to highlight the properties of the system separate from individual or group interests.[3] The performance of a political system includes two dimensions: effectiveness and efficiency.[4] There is a distinction between these two concepts as regards the performance of a political system. The idea relates to the question such as: what does a political system perform to attain a goal or value at what price and for whose benefit?

Here, of course, other considerations such as defining goals and priorities come into play. Who determines what is good for people? Indeed, what is good for people is not necessarily good for a political system, and vice versa. Then, who shall have the final word? Indeed, decision making for the people in a society is part of the political process, and on the face of it, power and politics are intertwined. Yet power by itself being a crude concept, in many respects fails to satisfy as an explanation of the prevailing situation presented by a mixture of both conflict and accommodation.

In the domestic-and perhaps equally on the international level-power has more varied and subtle sources than in either force and violence or wealth and other tangible elements. It can be said that power grows and functions on legitimacy and without this latter, no individual or group in a political system can effectively claim authority. However, when the power is pretended to be acquired from a source outside the common will of the people, then a problem arises as to its legitimacy. This is the case when religion is the primary foundation and source of state power. Below we shall examine the matter on Islam as a polity with emphasis on the Shiite doctrine.



Islam and the Legitimate Authority

Islam is a religion in which all Moslems belonging to the Islamic community (umma) are made to resign a good part of their freedom and to forego their free choice of a leader.[5] They are required to bow to the authority whose legitimacy is derived from the divine law.[6] This is, at least theoretically, the model of a theocracy, a “community of God” or a state in which the supreme political power is held by Allah, his apostle Muhammad and his legitimate successors.

In Islamic political thought, contrary to Christianism, any distinction between church and state (in the Christian sense), is totally superfluous. Since, the umma, or the Islamic community of believers, partakes of the nature of both and the purposes of one is the very raison d’ être of the other. Hence, Islamic leader, in the true sense of the doctrine, derives his political power from his divine office and is not subordinate but to the will of Allah. Thus, religion and politics as well as social order, economic matters and other business of life and society, come to be intertwined in the administration of the umma.[7]

In spite of the intimate relationship between the temporal and spiritual spheres in the Moslem community, the Qur’an does not contain explicitly what may be considered civic or state legislation.[8] The nearest approximate to anything of the kind is a broad provision addressed to the faithful Moslems to obey God and his apostle, and “them that have command among you”.[9]

The Caliphate or the Imamat, according to a Moslem scholar Mawardi who wrote on The Laws concerning Ruler-ship, were divinely appointed in succession to the office of the Prophet, in order to defend the faith and secure the right government of the world. The qualification of the legitimate authority in Islam varies according to different branches: Sunni orthodox and various sects of Shiism. The following section focuses on the Shiite Doctrine.


The Shiite Doctrine

From an early date, after the founder of the Islamic faith passed away, legitimacy of the so-called Islamic government and the authority of the incumbent rulers were opposed to and challenged by a group of faithful Moslems. The opposition was based on the belief that the leaders of the faith and the Islamic community had deviated from the true Islamic teaching and traditions as well as the divine law of Qur’an. They were charged to have acquired power through usurpation and brought tyranny instead of justice and thus led the Islamic community into error.

This faction of Moslem believers who identified itself with Shiism, held the opinion that God would send a true leader (Imam) who some day in the future would end the time of troubles, overthrow the kingdom of evil and establish the true reign of God and the true Islam, by means of Imamat. This messianic deliverer came to be known as the “Mahdi”, the rightly guided one.[10]

During the past centuries, many contenders and pretenders arose to claim the office, but most of them failed. Some, however, succeeded and established new sects and schisms. Shiism is one such deviation which, right from its inception, mounted opposition against the usurping rulers and associated with Imam Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son in law.

The Shiites, or the followers of Imam Ali and his descendants, have always claimed the right of rebellion against evil and illegitimate governments which had taken away the political power from the authentic successor of Prophet Muhammad. The question of legitimacy has always been a dominant issue in Shiism, and the quarrel between Imam Ali’s legitimate successors to imamat and the Caliphs has lasted too long. The martyrdom of Imam Hossein, the younger son of Imam Ali, in Karbala (a city situated in present Iraq), is a symbolic event of important political and religious dimensions which represents a decisive confrontation between “truth and falsehood.” This self-sacrifice for the cause of Islam, by opposing the powerful and tyrannical ruler, has set an example which even now, after fourteen centuries, is the noblest guide of Moslem Shiites[11].

Iran is a typical country which after its people accepted Islam in the first century of the Hegra,[12] replaced its former religion and followed the Shiite school. In this respect, some scholars assert that Persians extreme devotion to the Shiite doctrine and its symbol of faith and martyrdom, Imam Hossein, stems from the fact that he married the daughter of the last Persian king (Yazdigerd) defeated by Moslems. They believe that Shiism is an outgrowth of dominant Persian social and political traditions, translated into a more bearable and tolerable doctrine associated with Islam.[13]

Presumably, these arguments have originated from the belief that Islam extended itself into larger world by means of external power before its fundamental doctrine had crystallized and taken on definite form.[14] Some historians contend that those who participated in the expansion of Islam were Moslems who had not yet incorporated religion and Islamic faith into their consciousness to any substantial degree.[15] It is also suggested that from the beginning Moslem practice had to come to terms with the existing facts, prevailing traditions and norms which of necessity look beyond the dogmatism of canonical and divine law.

Thus, a prominent feature of Islamic theology has been its recognition of the fait accompli through which elements that was actually incompatible or opposed to the original doctrine, but through time had gained customary force, was accepted under the label of normative religious tradition (Sunna).[16] There are some who believe that the particular aspect of Islam developed in Shiite tradition is a result of such dynamism.

Henry Corbin,[17] a French scholar who has done extensive work on Shiism and Moslem mysticism, attempts to demonstrate the continuity (or resurgence) of the principal Zoroastrian themes in Persian Shiism. The argument suggests that the Shiite doctrines have been transposed and harmonized through interpretation with Zoroastrian themes and even with Hellenic philosophy.[18] If one follows Corbin’s analyses, Shiism presents a spiritual world or a mode of religious thought strangely coherent and permanent, transcending the boundaries of religious doctrine”.[19]

Whether Shiism is an outgrowth of Persian spirituality derived from Zoroastrianism, Hellenic philosophy in its oriented form,[20] or the illuminative mysticism of Suhrawardi,[21] or simply a sui generis doctrine developed out of Islam in a particular socio-political environment and historical period, it is the foundation of an important ideological and revolutionary movement. This ideology has shown continuous hostility toward secular and temporal state power and legitimacy. By endorsing the principle of Imamat, Shiite Moslems only recognize Imam Ali’s twelve successive descendants as legitimate authorities who can govern the community of Moslems. On the question of application of this principle after the long absence of the twelfth Imam, however, there is no consensus among various scholars and religious leaders.

Muhammad Ghazali, the learned Persian Moslem scholar of twelfth century A.D., wrote “there are those who hold that the imamat is dead, lacking as it does the required qualifications. But no substitute can be found for it; what then? Are we to give up obeying the law? Shall we dismiss the qadis; declare all authority to be valueless, leaving the populace to live in sinfulness? Or shall we continue, as we are, recognizing that imamat really exists and all acts of the administration are valid….?”[22]

Most Shiite scholars of various periods seem to agree with Ghazali and prefer the kind of government which claims legitimacy through divine law, even if accompanied by tyranny, turmoil and civil war.[23] They even went as far as to suggest that rebellion against such government would mean rebellion against the Imam of the time (valieasr), and ultimately rebellion against the Prophet and God. The implication of such charges and its political consequences are indeed very serious and practically it is impossible for a Moslem believer to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the office-holder and the leader (imam) of the Islamic community.

Once Shiism became state religion in Iran by the Safavids (1499-1736),it rejected the religious legitimacy of the Caliphate and adhered to what was akin monarchy. At that period the belief was that monarchy was the best form of government in the absence of the Mahdi (the savior). Thus, to this extent the Persian monarchy carried a positive religious aspect along with the traditional hereditary succession of kingdom. The monarch was considered as the legitimate ruler who was supposed to rule with the consent of the religious scholars. His essential responsibility was to safeguard the Sharia or the divine law and promulgate Islam. Subsequent rulers of various dynasties capitalized on this aspect of Shiism and linked their legitimacy to religion and God.[24]

Islamic Governance: Toward the Guardian State

Despite the fact that Islamic teachings in general provide for socio-political as well as individual guidance for Moslems and the Islamic society, in recent time no such governance was organized in Moslem communities. Of course, some endeavors to restore the laws of Shari’ah and to form an Islamic government have taken place, but so far no consensus has been reached on the matter of unified and uniformed governance. Thus, each attempt has reflected one particular interpretation of Islam.

It is not quite clear whether the emerging new phenomenon, identified with Islamic fundamentalism, has any relevant connection with Shiite doctrine. But, there are some arguments that this radical social and political behavior has originated from the Shiite revolutionary fervor in Iran and gradually propagated its vehemence throughout the Middle East. However, most social and political observers are caught in a dilemma in the analysis of the situation. In effect, so far it has proved to be very difficult to appreciate the true origin, the path and the implications and future trend of the Shiite movement in the region. On the one hand, it is suggested that what has happened in Iran was a revolutionary social movement directed against the Shah’s dictatorship by the people who identify them-selves by religious rather than political affiliation.

The above suggestion is supported to the extent that, from a cultural point of view, Iranians, have not yet acquired maturity in order to participate in party politics and to make known their social desires in society. Thus, the only unifying element, capable of changing the status quo without formidable political organization was religion, i.e. Shiism, as a revolutionary party, with numerous headquarters- the mosques- scattered throughout the country.

On the other hand, the leader of the movement was a religious man (Ayatollah Khomeini), deeply attached to the Shiite doctrine and widely accepted as the political enemy of the Shah whose legitimacy was permanently challenged by the spiritual leader. This latter benefited to a great extent from his charisma and capitalized on Islamic teachings for launching mass protests and demonstrations against the legitimacy of the constitutional monarchy in Iran. In so doing, he was more a political contender than a religious leader. Thus, when Shah’s regime fell apart, the spiritual man saw automatically the whole power of the state in his hands and became considered by a great majority of Moslems of Shiite faith, as the Imam or the true leader of the Islamic Umma.

The political philosophy of Shiism is rather complex and in some instances lacks concrete methodology. This is at least the impression a lay-researcher gets from examining the classical literature about the Shiite school and ideology.[25] More modern Shiite scholars, who have been acquainted with Western social, scientific research and methodology, have attempted to provide convincing justifications for Shiite doctrine on state authority and legitimacy.

According to the late Iranian religious teacher and intellectual, Ali Shariati, “Society is like a garden, founded upon God’s customs….The Qur’an, while admitting that society is built upon unchangeable laws, does not in any way; deny the responsibility of humanity and human being.”[26] This is in sort, the rejection of the fatalists’ point of view or the view of historic determinism. Not surprisingly, Shariati approach to the question of political power and legitimacy in Islamic Shiism is rather biased and somehow tilted toward apologetic stance.[27]

As Shariati’s study was the sociology of religion, he tried to compile a kind of sociology of religion on the basis of Islam and the Qur’an. He discovered in his own words: “scientific suggestion of history and sociology which reflect the prophet’s customs.”[28] This is presumably the opposite of what happens when one tries to analyze and interpret the Qur’an as philosophy or when one uses contemporary science to study the policies of the prophet or the political, social, and moral system which he presented to the society.[29]

This Moslem scholar endeavors, though perhaps not vainly from the Shiite point of view; to associate the question of legitimate political power in society to God’s will. Arguing that the prophet Mohammad was not an elected individual, therefore his mission and the continuity of his movement shall be guaranteed by Prophet’s appointment (his son-in-law Imam Ali). The argument continues like this: “As the Prophet announced his mission without the permission of the people, built society… his school should be continued by one who is most similar to him…”[30] this succession by appointment does not terminate here. It opens the door for a thoroughly different system of legitimate political and religious authority i.e. the concept of Imamat. The basic tenet of the principle, as stated very briefly earlier, involves the endowment of the leadership of the Islamic society to twelve generations of Imam Ali’s descendents, called Imams, the last of them believed to have disappeared, but lives an eternal life. He will reappear one day as the messiah and the savior of mankind from sin and corruption.

Shariati does not elaborate explicitly on the concept of “velayate faqih” or clerical regency which is based on the theory that during the absence of the twelfth Shiite Imam, the political leadership of the society is vested to a clergy (faqih) who is placed on the top of the religious hierarchy. However, he distinguishes two historic phases after Prophet: “one is a temporary phase of the twelve leaders (Imams) of Islamic society. They guide Islamic history in order to foster Islamic society. This is organized by means of twelve particular individuals chosen by the prophet.”[31] With regard to the second phase, the Prophet has been silent. One interpretation of this silence is that during the remaining time the Islamic society will be guided on the principle of council and allegiance, tradition of the Prophet and the spirit of Islam. A liberal construction of this latter viewpoint suggests a fully democratic system of political legitimacy founded upon reliance on people, public council and majority vote.[32]

From a political point of view, it is interesting to note that advocates of a continuing political role for the clergy and those who firmly oppose to the exercise of political power and authority by religious sector, both use Shariati’s arguments and writings to justify their respective positions.

In practice, the quarrel between the two sectors is not merely an academic and intellectual debate, but it involves a fundamental conflict over the political legitimacy of the regime and hence the very nature of Iran’s revolution and political system.[33]

From a legal and practical perspective, the questions of state’s authority and legitimacy are settled in the following terms in Iran’s new constitution:

“The Islamic Republic is a system of government based on the faith in:

- The one God ..; that He establishes the Shari’ah (canon law), and that man should resign to his will;
- The divine revelations and their fundamental role in the interpretation of laws;
- The resurrection and its constructive role in man’s perfection towards God;
- The justice of God in creation and in establishing the Canon law;
- The uninterrupted imamat and leadership and its fundamental role in the continuity of the revolution of Islam.[34]

The principle of Imamat in the absence of Mahdi the savior is further established in Article 5 of Iran’s constitution as follows:

“During the total absence of Hazrat-e-Vali-ye Asr (Ruler of the Time) may the Almighty let his advent come to pass soon, the authority to command and lead the people shall be an Islamic theologian and canonist, just, virtuous, abreast of the time, brave, organizer and judicious, whom the majority of people accept as their leader.”[35]

The Article further provides for a council of leadership with the above qualifications in the case no single person can acquire the consent of the people.[36]

Outside the theological foundation of the above constitutional provisions, and metaphysical Islamic principles embodied therein, many of the rules codified in this document are akin to every modern constitution of the world. Commonly included among such principles are e. g. freedom of individual and property, freedom of association, separation of state power, equal justice and due process, political, cultural, and economic independence and a host of other humanitarian and democratic principles. In practice however, many of the provisions lack the necessary clarity in certain primordial issues and leave ambiguities and room for political interpretation, thus paving the ground for violations.[37]

For the first time in the history of Islam and the particular faith identified with Shiism, a system of state has emerged through revolution and asserts legitimacy by embarking on dual concepts: On the one hand, it claims to be establishing the Shari’ah or the canon law of Islam; on the other hand, it attempts to incorporate social, political, and other democratic concepts of life into its constitution.

Indeed, there are obvious links between such declaratory principles as separation of power, democratic freedoms and rights, the rule of law and equal justice, etc, since all of these ideals seek to restrain the coercive power of the state in the interest of the people. But, even fully constitutional and guaranteed rights are apt to be illusory, since when religion identifies itself with the very substance of politics and social matters, the man-made laws are always at the risk of being repudiated by the divine principles whose interpretation is the monopoly of the religious sphere. In such circumstances, the true believers of the faith forcibly lose the ability to make political choice and distinction. Because, every individual Moslem is religiously bound to imitate its political behavior and action according to the patterns dictated or established by the faqih or mujtahid (Authorities on Islamic theological and canon law).[38]

The notion of legitimacy and state’s power and authority in the Shiite faith is in a state of flux and the process is still a continuing one, fermenting under the influence of opposing socio-political forces. Thus, at this stage no realistic attempt to define the true framework, path, substance, objects, and destination of the movement, seems to be possible.

State legitimacy as viewed from the religious perspective can be tested in many ways, depending on the circumstances and the sources it is acquired. Though the means of such evaluation may be different, their natures are often the same and the degree of their efficiency usually determines their viability and endurance. Legitimacy through sacredness by mean of ideology and legitimacy through perpetual revolution are the subjects of the following sections.


The Ideological Dimension

There is usually a pitfall in creating a dominant ideology for the sake of acquiring power and legitimacy. That is when the ideological leader endeavors to make a sacrosanct out of state existence or political objectives, he himself become prisoner of his invention. Since, there is always the risk that his legitimacy comes under serious scrutiny when the established norms are violated.[39]

Given the fact that an ideology, especially when it emerges with a social revolution, can not remain static, usually new elements come into play and new situations create a need for new objectives and therefore new explanations and rhetoric’s to justify the case. When inconsistencies show up, ambiguities result both in the eyes and perception of people and hence legitimacy of the leader runs into trouble.

If we approach a political system by considering its inherent or acquired capability in dealing with various situations or problems of the society, we may get a feeling of its legitimacy and long-run viability. There is no doubt that various political systems respond differently to the challenge of new emerging situations and crisis in peace or in war.

Democratic systems respond to the crisis or situations variables by “trying to mediate between contending groups in order to produce effective politics that can ameliorate the causes of tension.”[40] In this case the effectiveness of the decision and its success lie on the one hand upon the government or the political apparatus as a dependent variable and on the other hand upon the people or society as an independent entity.[41] In this case the legal and institutional framework determines the relationship between the people and government.

In a totalitarian political system the above situation is usually reversed. This is to say that in the case when a problem arises, the political apparatus considering it an independent entity tries to transform the entire society and to push it towards its own objectives.[42]In the above situation, the only way to dominate the will of the people and the society as a whole is to define the goals of the political system in a manner to give them a sacred character i.e. to make a taboo out of objectives. Thus, ethical and religious precepts tend to become ideology as political symbols which help to provide legitimacy.[43] Unlike a democratic government, the totalitarian system which seeks to justify its existence by means of religion and metaphysics tends to become monopolistic and monistic. Therefore, the two systems represent fundamentally different approaches to the question of political power and legitimacy.

Considering the fact that government is the unique organ in a society which has virtual monopoly over the instruments of force, it is the sole legitimate agency for the exercise of power. The question which arises in this respect is whether government and the political system act on behalf of the society or on its own behalf. That is to say, which one-people or government- has the preeminence? Where and when government acts on behalf of the society, power tends to be more or less egalitarian and decentralized. While, in the opposite situation it becomes very highly monopolized and centralized and usually society’s claimed objectives acquire a sacred or taboo character.[44]This is the situation when the guardian state justifies its existence for the society in crisis or facing an imminent threat.

The interesting point to note in the above approach to the analysis of political systems is that the sacred or sacrosanct character of political objectives does not belong to early religious societies but it applies to many modern states as well. Such is the case of Marxism-Leninism whose sacred attributes were so cruelly visible in the late Soviet Union during the horrendous purges and trials of the 1930s. China’s attempt to ritualize the authority of its charismatic leader, Mao, was due to the sacred characteristic attached to his words and teachings during his lifetime. Nazism and Fascism both had created sacred objectives for their proper societies upon which dictators such as Hitler and Mussolini built their power and political legitimacy.


Western modern societies have been dragged to this trap after the September 11th terrorist attacks and other violence threatening their democratic values and security. The phenomenon is spreading all over the world. There is only a consequential difference between modern and traditional countries. The common trait of all is their attachments to some sort of governance based on ideology, religion, race, language, nationality or purely philosophical considerations, be it Islam, Christianity, Buddhism or others.


The Perpetual Revolution

Newly emerged traditional regimes, through a process of social revolution and political independence, usually tend to organize their structure according to the accepted norms of the world community. By and large this initially enhances the process of acquisition of legitimacy. Since, the unity of a nation and legitimacy of its government are urgent problems of political leaders, often a new regime that comes to power after a social revolution tries to respond to the will and wishes of the people. Thus, newly established political apparatus are imitative after constitutional patterns of Western democracies. A constitution enshrining freedom and justice, popular government, parliamentary practice, separation of state power, etc. becomes the symbol of legitimacy.

In real world, however, the actual function of laws, principles and doctrines is a quite different story. In practice, often soon after the regime has succeeded to establish its power and authority, it starts to go its own way and deviate from the principles and promises upon which it founded its authority and acquired legitimacy. Then the political system gradually transforms its very nature by becoming an independent variable in the society where people must follow the dictate of the regime.

When a political system fails to offer the people what it had promised, in a democratic system it has no other choice than to recede itself from the power and leave the ground as provided for in the constitution or other legal provisions of the state. But a revolutionary regime that seeks conformity by force and coercion and leans upon a charismatic or religious figure for strict allegiance, has no other choice than to continue to claim legitimacy and rule despite people’s will. In such situation, naturally, dissention and discontent begin to surface and the regime, relying on its coercive power and force, tends to suppress opposition. This process creates an atmosphere in which the seeds of dictatorship will be scattered.

The implication of the above phenomenon is that gradually both governments, political and social system tend to be subsumed under the authority of a single person or party which in real sense determines the fate of a nation and stand not only above the law but also over the will of people. When religion and metaphysics, as an important dimension of social and political order, come to the support of such revolutionary regime, the situation becomes very complex. In other words, when revolution is identified as a product of religious movement for salvation, the issue of political legitimacy in a democratic sense tends to be considered a secondary matter with respect to the supreme will of God. Along the same line, everything else, even decision making process and socio-political apparatus, all become subordinate to the divine order, as of course interpreted by his apostle.

In such circumstances, legitimacy becomes imbued with faith and religious principles and rituals. Even legally and structurally responsible agents of the government can make decision and maneuver only within a limited framework and “line” which is determined by the supreme leader or on his behalf by his entourage and protégés. In other words, the political apparatus spells out only technical and bureaucratic decisions within the pre-established policy line dictated explicitly or in an implicit manner to it.[45] Thus, the role of the government representing the executive branch, parliament or legislative and the judiciary becomes secondary and overshadowed by the authority of revolutionary, charismatic or religious leader.[46]

To evaluate this type of regime, one runs into trouble, since normative criteria at hand, most often are associated with democratic systems evolved under different political environment. How far individual rights and liberties, separation of power, the actual functioning of constitutional checks and balances and other essential democratic and human principles must be observed, protected and cherished, is certainly the dilemma of new emerging revolutionary or fundamentalist regimes of the traditional World.

On the one hand, to use the accepted standards of behavior in the international community (if indeed such things exist) for judging a new political system emerged out of a revolution, this might produce misleading results. On the other hand, if we make a case out of every single situation, we may run into the trouble of analyzing such sui generis situation in vacuum or isolation of the world order. For example, Cuba in Latin America, Libya in North Africa, Iran in the Middle-East, Vietnam in the Far East, and many other typical cases, have each overthrown the existing government through violence, civil war or revolution and established new ones on new principles and premises, but non of them have followed the path they had promised to their people. Each of them acquired legitimacy under different circumstances and through different means, though their general political outlook may seem alike.

Sometimes the set of criteria on which basis a regime emerges out of a social revolution or builds its legitimacy may appear quite irrational, banal or primitive. The contrary may also be true; that is, a regime may claim legitimacy by means of highly complex and sophisticated set of ideas. Shiite revolutionary principles may be of this type for which no adequate and scientific knowledge is still available in Western academic thought. It represents a complex social phenomenon in which religion and politics are intertwined to the point that one identifies itself with the other, while revolution is an indivisible element of both. It is a very sophisticated model whose application and viability as a new set of political philosophy for modern state system, are yet to be observed and evaluated.[47]

Often in revolutionary condition, many irrational and unconventional acts committed or decisions are made under the cover of emergency measures for the benefit of the regime. In such circumstances both government and officials are tempted to set aside the essential and basic rights of the people. But soon after when revolutionary fervor recedes, the difficulties begin to surface for which the political system can no longer advance a persuasive explanation for the continuing violation of constitutional rights and disregard of the preferred values and interests of the people.

A political system may survive in such change of condition only if it has acquired the needed capacity to continue to perform efficiently and respond to the people’s expectations. Naturally, if the political system loses its self-confidence, it will lose its credibility, legitimacy and finally its survivability.[48]

If the question of political legitimacy of a revolutionary or religious regime in the 21st century is considered from a practical point of view, that is, not only the manner it came to power, but by the way it functions or responds to the basic needs, interests, and values of the people, then, the viability of a religious revolution in the contemporary scene comes under serious doubt. This point is amplified when the efficiency of the regime is tested against its performance and capacity for development in economic, social and political fields.

Assuming that there is a certain limit on people’s tolerance and threshold for enduring scarcity, poverty, insecurity, and injustice, a revolutionary regime that lacks those basic requirement or is otherwise incapable to achieve those objectives, will encounter serious challenge to its legitimacy from within. Since, masses usually know political regimes by their fruits.[49]


So long as there is consensus about what is legitimate, politics and government will continue to function.[50] When legitimacy is challenged, the nature of the political system and its safety-valves determine the outcome of the conflict. A revolutionary regime, by its very nature, lacks the capacity to self-correction and avowal of failure. The result is either a prolonged dictatorship or a sudden collapse, depending on the force of opposition and the viability of political alternatives.


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Notes

[1]. See Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 3rd ED. (Englewood cliffs. Prentice Hall International, Inc., 1983) p. 60.
[2]. CF. Ibid. P. 62.
[3]. Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government, op. cit. p. 229.
[4]. Effectiveness is making an unlikely outcome more likely to happen. Efficiency is the ratio between change in the probability of the outcome and the costs incurred in producing it. See Deutsch, Ibid. p. 230.
[5] See e.g., Shahram Akbarzadeh, Abdullah Saeed, eds. Islam and Political Legitimacy, Originally Published: 22 May 2003. This is a most recent book which explores the challenging issues of Islamisation of political power. It presents a comparative analysis of Muslim societies in West, South, Central and South East Asia and highlights the immediacy of the challenge for the political leadership in those societies. Islam and Political Legitimacy contends that the growing reliance on Islamic symbolism across the Muslim world, even in states that have had a strained relationship with Islam, has contributed to the evolution of Islam as a social and cultural factor to an entrenched political force. The geographic breadth of Islam and Political Legitimacy offers readers an appraisal of political Islam that transcends parochial peculiarity. Contributors to this volume examine the evolving relationship between Islam and political power in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan. This review is taken from Taylor and Francis e-bookstores. Islam and Political Legitimacy - More Information.htm

[6]. See e. g. Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, 2nd Ed (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 275.
[7]. In Roman Jurisprudence also the ius sacrum was part of ius publicum, while the emperor was just the same Pontifex maximus. See ibid. p. 276.
[8]. Idem.
[9]. Commentators have interpreted this verse differently; some have included the Caliphs, qadis (saints), commanders of troops and those who know law. The Shiite interpretation is directed toward the principle of Imamat. See: infra.
[10]. It was generally agreed that the savior would be of the seed of the Prophet Muhammad. CF. Heresy and Revolt, in Islam, edited and translated by Bernard Lewis (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1974), pp. 50-68: see also Ali Shariati, Art Awaiting the Savior, Translated by Homa Fardjadi (Tehran Iran: The Shariati Foundation, 1979), passim.
[11] It has to be noted that not all Islamic historians support the contention that Imam Hossein fought for the defense of rightful authority of Imam Ali’s descendents, but rather it was a tribal quarrel between families. See in general Islamic history written by unbiased historians other than Shiites.
[12]. Hegra or Hegira is the year of migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in A. D. 622, according to most account on September 20. This is the milestone of Moslem calendar dates counted on lunar or solar system.
[13]. CF. Morteza Motahari, Mutual Services of Islam and Iran [in Persian] (Ghom, Iran: Sadra Publishers, 1980), p. 122.
[14]. CF. Ignaz Goldziher, “Catholic Tendencies and Particularism in Islam”, in Merlin L. Swartz, (ed. Trans.), Studies on Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 123-4.
[15]. Ibid. p. 124.
[16]. Ibid. p. 126.
[17]. Henry Corbin, Terre Céleste et Corps de Resurrection, de l’Iran Mazdeen a l’Iran Shiite (Paris: 1960), passim.
[18]. See: R. Casper, “Muslim Mysticism: Tendencies in Recent Research,” In Merlin L. Swartz (ed. Trans.), Studies on Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 164-184, at p. 166-167.
[19]. Idem.

[20]. That is to say e. g. Neo-Pythagorism and Platonism transmitted by Persian Philosopher Ibne Sina (Avicenna) and his school.
[21]. Iranian Moslem scholar of 12th. Century A. D.
[22]. Iqtisad fil-itiqad (Cairo: A. H. 1321), p. 98. Quoted in Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, op. cit. p. 291.
[23]. CF. Idem. See also generally Seyyed Hossein Nasr. “Ithna Ashari Shiism and Iranian Islam in: Religion in the Middle-East, op. cit. pp. 96-118.
[24] This was true even after the constitutional revolution in Iran at the beginning of 20th century. Thus, Iran’s old constitution vested unto the Shah the rightful and legitimate authority of the state on behalf of God and the sovereign ruler was considered as the shadow of the Almighty on earth.
[25].Extensive works have been done by Shiite scholars on many aspects of the faith, but few of them, however, are available in Western languages. Therefore, it is not practical for studies such as the present to give references of books in Persian or Arabic which are not readily available to English readers for consultation.
[26]. See his: An approach to the Understanding of Islam (Tehran: The Shariati Foundation and Hamadani Publishers, 1979), p. 31.
[27]. It is worth noting that the late Ali Shariati (died in 1977) is one of the few, if not the only, Iranian scholar by modern standard who has devoted his life in studying and teaching Islam and the Shiite doctrine. Through his numerous courses he delivered prior to 1979 revolution in Iran, he advanced a liberal and open-minded interpretation of the Islamic philosophy. It should bee noted that Shariati’s approach to understanding Islam and Qur’an (which have more appeal to intellectuals), is no longer endorsed by fundamentalists as well as the majority of the clergy now in power in Iran.
[28]. CF. Ali Shariati, An Approach to the Understanding of Islam, op. cit. pp. 22-23.
[29]. Ibid. p. 23.
[30]. The Sunni orthodoxy believes that “the prophet formed an Islamic society, revealed the Qur’an and ended his mission… the principles and directives of Islam for the community were fixed. Therefore after the Prophet, we only need a political and social leader to rule and defend the community and we will select him according to our own discernment. “See: Ali Shariati, Selection and/or Election (Tehran: the Hosseiniyeh Ershad and the Hamadani Foundation 1979), pp. 3-4.
[31]. Ali Shariati, Selection and/or Election, cit. 10-11.
[32]. CF. Ibid. at p. 6. Shariati who regarded religion in general and Islam, translated into the political doctrine of Shiism, as a revolutionary movement, died in 1977 and did not witness the actual happening of Iran’s revolution. Presumably the kind of movement he persistently advocated had a much more bearable view of Islam and Shiism. His views were particularly appealing to what may be called non-secularized youth prior to the revolution and after it. A group of this youth Moslems associated themselves with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) as sympathizers or active participants. This group is now staging opposition against the ruling regime in Iran.
[33]. Thus far politically active clergy and their supporters have the necessary positions and instruments of coercive power to intimidate dissidents and impose what they believe to be true and authentic rules and traditions of Islam and demand adherence and conformity. They have not hesitated to use that power against those who are considered infidels or hypocrites and who oppose to the ruling elites’ interpretation of Islam and revolution in Iran and contest the power of the clergy.
[34]. Unofficial translation of Article 2 of the constitution. In the same article paragraph 6. a, the continuity of the revolution is secured in the “uninterrupted administration of Canon law by fully qualified jurisprudents on the basis of Scripture (the Qur’an) and the tradition of the fourteen Innocents for whom we invoke God’s blessing.”
[35] Idem
[36]. Article 107 of the constitution determines the manner in which a group of experts elected by the people shall consult about the qualifications of those considered competent as to be vested with the legitimate authority and religious leadership. If one such person is known to be pre-eminent above all others, he shall be appointed as the leader of the nation; otherwise, three or five authorities fully qualified for the leadership shall be appointed as members of the Council of leadership. The leader of the Council shall be a person of “scientific eligibility and theological virtues …..[With] political and social insight…”
[37]. For example, Article 19 of the Islamic constitution of Iran provides the following on the rights of people: “The people of Iran belonging to whatever ethnic or tribal group shall enjoy equal rights and the complexion, race, language, and the like shall not be considered as a privilege.” Curiously, these provisions fail to explicitly make mention of the important question of “religion”. Some critics assert that such an omission is not merely of a drafting nature but it entails the very substance of the matter which simply stems from religious intolerance and fundamentalism.
[38]. In Shiite faith, every individual is either a muqalid (an imitator) or mujtahid (a canonist or theological expert). The former is duty-bound to follow the latter.
[39]. CF. Ibid. P. 62.
[40].David E. Apter. Introduction to Political Analysis (New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India. Private Limited. 1981) p. 431.
[41]. CF. Idem.
[42]. Idem.
[43]. CF. Ibid. p.432.
[44]. CF. Ibid. p. 433.
[45]. Such may be the case of post-revolution Iran with respect to the so-called “Imam’s Line”. The “Party Line” of post-revolution Russia. Other classical example of this phenomenon can be found in varying forms in Nasser’s Egypt, Nyerere’s Tanzania, Ghana under Nkrumeh, and Algeria under Ben Bella. CF. David Apter, op. cit. p. 450.
[46]. Interestingly, in the case of Iran all of the above characteristics are assembled in the unique personality of the supreme leader (Imam) who is a religious revolutionary with powerful charismatic leadership.
[47]. The model has only been applied during the Prophet of Islam’s rule in the city of Medina. The society of Medina has now an overwhelming attraction to the modern revolutionary Moslems and it is considered the ideal type of government where the ruler is at the same time the leader of the faith and religion.
[48]. The downfall of the dictatorial regime of the Shah of Iran began the moment he admitted his defaults. There after, neither coercion nor use of force and violence helped to restore the lost order to save an apparently strong and stable monarchy. The Shah’s successor has learned by experience not to admit failure and stick firm to the power. Thus, the Islamic regime softly escaped numerous blows which took away its precious elites.
[49]. Cf. e.g. R. Hrair Dekmejian, “The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives,” The Middle-East Journal, 34, 1 (Winter 1980); Roger Homan, “The Original of the Iranian Revolution,” Book review in the Journal of International Affaires (1982), 673-677.
[50]. CF. Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government, op. cit. p. 16.